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ESSAY
THE TAKE-OR-PAY WARS: A CAUTIONARY
ANALYSIS FOR THE FUTURE*
J. Michael Medinat t
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."1l
"Experience enables you to recognize a mistake when you make it
again.
I. INTRODUCTION
The first generation of take-or-pay battles-those between the natu-
ral gas producers and pipeline companies ("pipelines")-is subsiding.3
* Copyright @ 1991 by J. Michael Medina. A modified version of this paper was presented to
the Special Institute on Natural Gas Marketing and Transportation conducted by the Rocky
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, September 20, 1991, in Santa Fe, New Mexico.
t B.A. summa cum laude, Southwestern College, Winfield, Kansas; J.D. with special distinc-
tion, 1975, University of Oklahoma. Adjunct Professor of Law, 1992, University of Tulsa, College
of Law, Tulsa, Oklahoma. Member, Holliman, Langholz, Runnels & Dorwart, P.C., Tulsa,
Oklahoma. Mr. Medina currently represents only producers in gas contract litigation.
t The contract provisions throughout this paper are intended only to stimulate discussion and
analysis.
1. 1 GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON 284 (2d ed. 1922).
2. LAURENCE J. PETER, PETER'S QUOTATIONS 174 (1979) (quoting Franklin P. Jones).
3. This paper will avoid extensive citations and will, for the most part, not cite authorities
discussed in earlier articles. For those interested in more extensive citations on gas contract litiga-
tion than those listed in this paper, see J. Michael Medina, Take-or-Pay Oklahoma Style, 60 OKLA.
B.J. 705 (1989); J. Michael Medina, The Take-or-Pay Wars A Further Status Report, 41 OKLA. L.
REv. 381 (1988) [hereinafter Medina, A Further Status Report]; J. Michael Medina, A Report from
the Battle Zone: The Take or Pay Wars, 58 OKLA. B.J. 2554 (1987) [hereinafter Medina, A Report
from the Battle Zone], reprinted in 24 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. DIG. 268 (1987); and J. Michael
Medina et al., Take or Litigate: Enforcing the Plain Meaning of the Take-or-Pay Clause in Natural
Gas Contracts, 40 ARK. L. REv. 185'(1986) [hereinafter Medina et al., Take or Litigate], reprinted in
24 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. DIG. 192 (1987). An extensive bibliography of materials on take-
or-pay contracts and litigation can be found in 8 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS,
OIL AND GAS LAW, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 1233-44 (1991).
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While major pieces of producer-pipeline litigation remain in the courts,4
attention has now turned to two new fronts: producer-lessor royalty dis-
putes5 and state severance tax controversies. 6 At this junction, it is ap-
propriate to look at past take-or-pay disputes and extract lessons to guide
future gas purchase contracting. Past litigation shows that courts will
not grant relief simply because a party enters into a bad bargain.' There
4. See Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Koch Indus., No. 91-174 (E.D. La. April 22,
1991) (holding "banked gas" of underproduced party covered by take-or-pay obligations); Pelto Oil
Co. v. CSX Oil & Gas Corp., 804 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
For an analysis of various gas balancing problems, see Wade A. Hoefling, Gas Balancing Problems in
a Deregulated Market: Changes and Possible Solutions Under Oklahoma Law, 25 TULsA L.J. 63
(1989); and Patrick H. Martin, The Gas Balancing Agreement: What, When, Why, and How, 36
RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 13.01 (1990). For an analysis of disproportionate gas sales by a
working interest owner and its relation to gas balancing, see David E. Pierce, The Law of Dispropor.
tionate Gas Sales, 26 TULSA L.J. 135 (1990).
5. See, eg., Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1988);
Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 708 F. Supp. 783 (E.D. La. 1989), rev'd, 943 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1991);
Mandell v. Hamman Oil & Ref. Co., No. 01-90-00950-CV, 1991 WL 248676 (rex, App.-Houston
[Ist Dist.] Nov. 27, 1991, no writ); Killam Oil Co. v. Bruni, 806 S.W.2d 264 (rex. App.-San
Antonio 1991, writ denied); Hamman Oil & Ref. Co. v. Mandell, No. 87-41636 (rex. Dist. Ct.
Harris County June 22, 1990); State v. Pennzoil Co., 752 P.2d 975 (Wyo. 1988); cf Finkelstein v.
Transamerican Natural Gas Corp. (In re Transamerican Natural Gas Corp.), 127 B.R. 800 (S.D.
Tex. 1991) (remanding to state court a dispute over a take-or-pay settlement). For recent discussions
on the issue of royalties, see Cyril A. Fox, jr., Rights of a Lessor in Payments Received by a Producer
from "Buydowns"or "Buyouts" of Long-Term Contracts, 10 E. MIN. L. INST. § 1.01 (1989); William
H. White, The Right to Recover Royalties on Natural Gas Take-or-Pay Settlements, 41 OKLA. L.
REv. 663 (1988); Kirk J. Bily; Comment, Royalty on Take-or-Pay Payments and Related Considera-
tion Accruing to Producers, 27 Hous. L. Rav. 105 (1990); and James E. Prince, Note, Production,
Production, What is Production? Diamond Shamrock v. Hodel, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1333.
6. See Elizabeth K. Brown & Frank H. McGregor, Fallout from the Take-or-Pay Wars. Gross
Production Tax on Proceeds Received in Settlement of Take-or-Pay Litigation, 43 OKILA. L. REV. 457
(1990); Michael P. Pearson & Richard D. Watt, To Share or Not to Share: Royalty Obligations
Arising out of Take-or-Pay or Similar Gas Contract Litigation, 42 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N
V 14.01, 14.03[2][c][ii] (1991); cf John S. Lowe, Severance Taxes as an Issue of Energy Sectional-
ism, 5 ENERGY L.J. 357 (1984).
7. Courts have consistently refused to save a party from a bad bargain. See, e.g., United States
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 301 (1942) (holding coercion was not established even
though government lacked bargaining strength because of its great need for warships); Aircraft As-
socs. & Mfg. Co. v. United States, 357 F.2d 373, 378 (Ct. Cl. 1966) ("Economic duress may not be
implied merely from the making of a hard bargain."); Fruhauf Southwest Garment Co. v. United
States, 111 F. Supp. 945, 951 (Ct. Cl. 1953) ("In order to substantiate the allegation of economic
duress... the plaintiff must go beyond the mere showing of a reluctance to accept and of financial
embarrassment."); LaBeach v. Beatrice Foods Co., 461 F. Supp. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding eco-
nomic duress did not vitiate release of monetary claims by discharged employee despite disparity of
bargaining power); W.J. Seufert Land Co. v. Greenfield, 496 P.2d 197, 201 (Or. 1972) (holding
contract provision that was harsh on one party and not the other was not against public policy);
Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 754 (Utah 1982) (holding that a bad bargain is not
a basis on which to invalidate an agreement).
Judicial unwillingness to interfere with a bad bargain is demonstrated by almost universal rejec-
tion of the pipeline defenses of unconscionability, impracticability, public policy, and mistake. In a
similar vein, courts seldom invalidate settlement agreements. E-g., Bryant v. Transcontinental Gas
Pipe Line Corp., No. B14-90-00590-CV, 1991 WL 114477 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] June
27, 1991, writ requested) (affirming order that enforced settlement agreements against producers);
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is no indication that this basic precept will change for future litigants. To
date, producers have prevailed in most take-or-pay disputes' because the
pipelines, who drafted most purchase contracts, failed to protect them-
selves, and not because of superior producer draftsmanship. The future
may not be so kind to the producers.
This paper first summarizes past producer-pipeline litigation wars.
Second, the successes and failures of battle strategies of both producers
and pipelines are examined. Finally, based upon the lessons learned from
past disputes, the paper analyzes specific clauses in gas purchase con-
tracts. The most important lesson learned from past take-or-pay disputes
is that courts will strictly enforce the terms of a gas purchase contract.9
Consequently, success in the future generations of take-or-pay wars will
depend upon carefully drafted contracts.
see J. Michael Medina, Economic Duress as a Means of Avoiding Settlement Agreements in
Oklahoma, 15 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REv. 255 (1990). Given their widely recognized validity, settle-
ment agreements must be carefully drafted. See Medina et al., Take or Litigate, supra note 3, at 253-
55, reprinted in 24 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. DIG. at 260-62.
8. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 54 F.E.R.C. 61,095 (1991).
9. See David E. Pierce, Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law: Relationships, Con-
tracts, Torts, and the Basics, 41 INST. ON OIL & GAs L. & TAX'N § 1.01, § 1.0312] (1990) ("lit is not
surprising to find language, conceived during another contracting era, which attempts to address the
parties' rights under weak market conditions. Although such language may not have been the focus
of negotiations leading to the contract, it is, nevertheless, equally enforceable."). This literal ap-
proach worked mostly in the past to benefit producers. E.g., Wagner & Brown II v. ONEOK, Inc.,
No. CIV-89-943-R (W.D. Okla. Mar. 29, 1990) (striking force majeure because pipeline sent notice
to operator, not seller as required by the contract); R.J.B. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Colorado Interstate
Gas Co., 813 P.2d 14, 24-25 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990) (strictly construing recoupment provisions and
disallowing the pipeline to offset breach of contract damages with the value of unrecouped gas).
Moreover, courts refused to allow pipeline companies to stand behind standard gas contract provi-
sions for protection against events not originally contemplated by the provisions. See, eg., Mustang
Prod. Co. v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Co., No. CIV-83-1667-BT, slip op. at 9-10 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 9,
1983) (holding that economic disconnect clause was intended to permit a pipeline to disconnect gas
wells that are uneconomical due to low production, not low market prices); cf Coastal Oil & Gas
Corp. v. FERC, 782 F.2d 1249, 1253 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding economic connection clause does not
limit dedication to interstate commerce; "Coastal's internal memoranda indicate that this interpreta-
tion was a new theory dreamed up by its counsel as recently as 1980").
Producers also lost cases because of the courts' insistence on strict performance of contract
terms. See, eg., Dyco Petroleum Corp. v. ANR Pipeline Co., No. 86-C-1097-C (N.D. Okla. Oct. 27,
1989) (denying producer's claims because it failed to provide notice of drainage damage to the pipe-
line company as required by the contract); Prima Energy Corp. v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., No.
89-CV-331 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Weld County Oct. 5, 1990) (enforcing assignment notice clause); Wil-
liams Natural Gas Co. v. Amoco Prod. Co., No. 11040, 1991 WL 58387 (Del. Ch. Apr. 16, 1991)
(enforcing ratable take clause to relieve pipeline of take-or-pay obligation when pipeline's loss of
other contracts in area caused it to take no gas from the seller); Lone Star Gas Co. v. G.S.G. Royalty
Corp., 757 S.W.2d 457, 459-60 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ) (construing "deemed produced"
clause strictly in favor of pipeline); Lone Star Gas Co. v. Lively Energy & Dev. Corp., No. 04-87-
00261-CV, slip op. at 3-11 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Oct. 11, 1989, no writ) (reversing lower court
award in favor of producer because pipeline's take-or-pay clause obligation was conditioned on own-
ership and producer did not have an ownership interest).
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II. EVOLUTION OF THE NATURAL GAS CONTRACT
Prior to 1960, fluctuations in the demand for natural gas created
financial hardships for natural gas producers. The demand for natural
gas increases substantially during winter months because natural gas is
used for commercial and residential heating. To handle winter peaks,
pipelines acquired an overabundance of production capacity from produ-
cers. In addition, pipelines insisted that producers exclusively dedicate
particular wells or reservoirs to the pipeline in the gas purchase contract.
Pipelines, however, were under no obligation to purchase gas from the
producers. As a result, during periods of low demand for natural gas
pipelines purchased less than full production from producers, if any gas
at all. Producers, unable to sell the gas to other purchasers because of
the exclusive dedication clause, suffered from lost gas sales revenue. In
many cases, producers were unable to recover drilling, exploration and
operation costs.
Producers sought refuge in the take-or-pay clause. The provision
required the pipeline to purchase a minumum quantity of gas each pe-
riod, regardless of whether the pipeline took the minimum quantity of
gas. In the event the pipeline paid for more gas than it took, it acquired
the right to take that gas in the future at no cost. The take-or-pay clause
assured the producer of continued revenue, regardless of the market de-
mand for gas.
Historically, the pipeline industry was rather cavalier toward the
take-or-pay clause. During the 1970s and early 1980s, pipelines rou-
tinely included the clause in natural gas contracts. Such clauses were
insignificant to the pipeline when considered in the overall context of the
contract because demand for natural gas had historically exceeded the
supply.
The producer was not as ambivalent toward inclusion of a take-or-
pay clause in the gas purchase contract. The producer always regarded
the take-or-pay clause as a necessity because a gas well is worthless if no
gas is sold.10
Take-or-pay clauses, however, are more than just bargaining chips in
negotiations for new gas reserves. They provide reasonable assurance
to the producer of a certain minimum income stream from a well in
cases where the producer is asked to make a long-term commitment of
10. Richard J. Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural
Gas Industry, 97 HARV. L. Rav. 345, 354-55 (1983); Vernon M. Turner, Natural Gas-Impact of
Deregulation or Reregulation on Sales Contracts, 29 RoCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 501, 522-23 (1983).
[Vol. 27:283
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its gas to a single buyer. Having dedicated its gas under such a con-
tract, it is of critical importance to the producer to have some assur-
ance of recovering its substantial investment in the wells involved.
Indeed, without a guaranteed minimum cash flow, producers are usu-
ally unwilling to commit their reserves to a single purchaser on a long-
term basis."1
By 1970, take-or-pay clauses became a standard part of the natural gas
contract; producers absolutely required the clause, and pipelines acqui-
esced because of the demand for natural gas.12
During the 1980s, falling natural gas prices caused pipelines to re-
gret inclusion of the take-or-pay clause in long-term natural gas con-
tracts. After the decline, the market price for gas was substantially less
than the fixed price in the contract in most instances. The price discrep-
ancy forced pipelines to choose between taking gas at the contract price
and reselling at the lower market price or paying for gas and taking it
later, with the hope that the market price would increase in the future.
As gas prices stabilized at less than long-term contract prices, pipelines
realized that performance under the old contracts would be unprofita-
ble.13 As a result, many pipelines attempted to minimize their liability
through negotiation and modification of the contracts, settlements and
litigation. These endeavors, however, resulted in little success for the
pipelines.
11. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 40 F.E.R.C. % 63,047 (1987), aff'd, 42 F.E.R.C. 1 61,024 (1988);
see also Susan Zachos, Comment, Gas Purchase Contracts. Equitable Remedies for Breach, 24 Hous.
L. REV. 991, 993-95 (1987); Order No. 500-K, Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decon-
trol, et al., III F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 30,917, at 30,090 (Apr. 4, 1991) ("The whole purpose of the
take-or-pay clause was to ensure the producer a minimum level of income by requiring the pipeline
either to purchase and pay for the gas or, if it did not purchase the gas, at least pay for it."); cf
Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 931 F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (producer's leverage
with pipeline diminishes as field diminishes).
12. Significant bargaining, however, continued in the industry. See Harry G. Broadman, Ele-
ments of Market Power in the Natural Gas Pipeline Industry, ENERGY J., Jan. 1986, at 119; William
B. Cassin, Gas Purchase Contracts--Enticing a Shy Genie from an Invisible Lamp, 25 INST. ON OIL
& GAS L. & TAx'N 27, 30-31 (1974); J. Harold Mulherin, Complexity in Long-Term Contracts: An
Analysis of Natural Gas Contractual Provisions, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORGAN. 105 (1986); see also Scott E.
Masten & Keith J. Crocker, Efficient Adaptation in Long-Term Contractr" Take-or-Pay Provisions for
Natural Gas, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 1083 (1985).
13. Pipelines bear the risk of a decreasing market price in a long-term gas contract. E.g.,
Prenalta Corp. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 944 F.2d 677, 680, 688 (10th Cir. 1991); Universal
Resources Corp. v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 813 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Panhandle E. Corp., 693 F. Supp. 88, 98 (D. Del. 1988), aff'd, 868 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1989); R.J.B.
Gas Pipeline Co., 813 P.2d at 25 ("[T]ake-or-pay provisions.., are deemed to [allocate] the risks
[and] must be strictly construed."); Valero Transmission Co. v. Mitchell Energy Corp., 743 S.W.2d
658, 663 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1987, no writ) ("[T]he uncertainty of future market prices
is often the motivation for entering into a long-term contract. The primary purpose of a price agree-
ment is to fix the price and consequently avoid the risk of price fluctuation.").
1991]
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Despite pipelines' harsh experiences, the long-term contract remains
an important part of the natural gas industry. Although producers and
pipelines have experimented with other arrangements, 14 long-term con-
tracts remain mutually beneficial for both parties. 5
III. THE TAKE-OR-PAY CLAUSE
A typical take-or-pay clause specifies an annual minimum quantity
of gas for which the producer will be compensated. The minimum quan-
tity is typically a fraction of either the deliverability of the gas well or the
underground gas reserves dedicated to the contract.16 In the event the
purchaser fails to take the minimum annual quantity, the purchaser must
pay a "deficiency payment." This payment is equivalent to the value of
14. With the gas surplus of 1982 came a radical shift in the natural gas industry. Short-term
("spot market") contracts emerged as the standard industy practice. In contrast with previous long-
term contracts, newer long-term contracts contained a "take-or-release" in lieu of a take-or-pay
clause. A take-or-release clause is one "which gives the seller the right to terminate the contract if
the buyer does not take minimum amounts of gas." WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 3, at 1246.
15. With deregulation and the shifting roles of pipelines, new opportunities for contracting
arise. However, the same desire for market stability that led to long-term contracts in the first place
will continue to encourage long-term contracts in the future. Equitrans, Inc., 52 F.E.R.C. 61,228,
at 61,814-15 (1990) (discussing need to provide incentives functionally similar to take-or-pay clauses
to induce producers to restructure relationship with purchasers, and noting need of producers to
have revenue certainty); R. Glenn Hubbard & Robert J. Weiner, Efficient Contracting and Market
Power: Evidence from the US. Natural Gas Industry, 34 J.L. EcoN. 25, 64-65 (1991) (predicting that
economics and market efficiency will lead to reemergence of long-term contracting).
For an analysis of the benefits of long-term contracting, see Harry C. Broadman & Michael A.
Toman, Non-Price Provisions in Long Term Natural Gas Contracts, 62 LAND ECON. I11 (1986);
Michael E. Canes & Donald A. Norman, Long-Term Contracts and Market Forces in the Natural
Gas Market, 10 J. ENERGY & DEV. 73 (1984); Thomas G. Johnson, Natural Gas Sales Contracts, 34
INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 83, 108-09 (1983); Norris C. McGowen, Natural Gas-Its Present
and Future, 4 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 133, 142 (1953); Ernst-Joachim Mestmiicker, Natu-
ral Gas in the European Internal Market: A Comparative Analysis of Common Carriage and Price
Transparency, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 691 (1990); Pierce, supra note 10, at 356-57, 383-84.
For recent articles on natural gas contracts, see 4 W.L. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS
§ 762 (Supp. 1991); Joe Caggiano, Understanding Natural Gas Contracts, 38 OIL & GAS TAx. Q. 267
(1989); William H. Penniman & Gail S. Gilman, Negotiating a Direct Gas Purchase Contract for the
End User, 10 E. MIN. L. INST. § 17.01 (1989); Carroll L. Gilliam, Gas Sales Contracts in a Changing
Market, 37 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N § 6.01 (1986); J. Clayton La Grone, The Supply Side of
Cogeneration, 36 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 14.01 (1990); John S. Lowe, A New Generation of
Gas Contracts, 8 CORP. COUNSEL REV. 1 (1989); Masten & Crocker, supra note 12; Arthur J.
Wright, Contractual Issues in Marketing Natural Gas in the 1990's, 36 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
§ 16.01 (1990); Danton B. Rice & Michael A. Schlueter, Note, Deregulation and Natural Gas
Purchase Contracts: Examination Through Neoclassical and Relational Contract Theories, 25 WASH-
BURN L.J. 43,46-49 (1985). See also Apache Gas Prods. Corp. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 509 P.2d
109, 112-13 (Okla. 1973) (recognizing necessity for long-term contracts in natural gas industry).
16. For example, a minimum quantity could be "seventy-five percent (75%) of the Delivery
Capacity of each well." See Medina et al., Take or Litigate, supra note 3, at 187, reprinted in 24 Pun.
LAND & RESOURCES L. DIG. at 194. For a recent discussion of the take-or-pay clause, see Prenalta
Corp. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 944 F.2d 677, 679-81 (10th Cir. 1991).
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the difference between the minimum annual quantity and the amount
taken during the year.
Another traditional term in the contract between producer and pipe-
line is the recoupment provision. The recoupment provision of the take-
or-pay clause allows the buyer to take, without payment, a quantity of
gas valued at the amount of the deficiency payments paid in previous
periods. Three concepts govern recoupment. First, a buyer may recoup
only after taking the minimum quantity for the current year. 17 Second,
the recoupment quantity is determined by the contract price of the gas at
the time of recoupment. Third, the buyer's right to recoup may be lim-
ited in time by law or contract. In the event the buyer does not recoup
within the time limit, the buyer forfeits the right to recoup and the seller
is allowed to keep the deficiency payments. Some contracts allow the
buyer to recoup during the life of the contract. Others require the seller
to return any outstanding deficiency payments at the end of the contract.
IV. PRODUCER'S HISTORICAL REMEDIES
The producer's primary remedy to enforce its rights under the con-
tract was a suit to collect past due deficiency payments. Typically, dam-
ages equaled the value of the difference between the minimum quantity
and the quantity taken. For example, if the pipeline was required to
purchase 750,000 cubic feet ("cf") of natural gas per year and only
purchased 50,000 cf, the pipeline's deficiency would be 700,000 cf. At a
contract price of $3.00 per 1000 cf, the pipeline would owe the producer
a deficiency payment of $2,100 for that accounting year.
Pipelines have disputed this method of calculating damages, citing
UCC remedy provisions. Section 2-708(1) provides a "measure of dam-
ages for non-acceptance or repudiation by the buyer [equal to the] differ-
ence between the market price at the time and place for tender and the
unpaid contract price together with.., incidental damages."18 Pipelines
argued that under the section 2-708(1) damage formula producers are
required to deduct the market price of the gas at the time of breach from
the contract price. ' 9
17. E.g., Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline Co. v. InterNorth, Inc. 595 F. Supp. 497, 500
(N.D. Tex. 1984).
18. U.C.C. § 2-708(1), 1B U.L.A. 265 (1989).
19. Gas purchase contracts are governed by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See
Manchester Pipeline Corp. v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 862 F.2d 1439, 1444-46 (10th Cir. 1988)
(applying Oklahoma's version of UCC remedies to breach of gas contract); Kerr-McGee Corp. v.
Northern Utils., Inc., 673 F.2d 323, 328-30 (10th Cir.) (applying UCC unconscionability provision
to gas contract), cerL denied, 459 U.S. 989 (1982); Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F.2d 360, 388 (5th
1991]
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Producers countered with numerous arguments to show that the ap-
plication of section 2-708(1) to take-or-pay disputes yields inequitable re-
sults. First, based on the section 2-708(1) formula, the producer would
be unable to receive damages if, at the time of breach, the market price
exceeded the contract price.20 In such a market, a pipeline's threat of
Cir. 1981) (applying UCC writing requirement to gas contract), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982); J.
Thomas Hardin, Applicability ofArticle 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code to Oil and Gas Contracts,
23 ARK. LAW. 57 (1989); William J. Legg & Joseph R. Dancy, The Applicability of the Uniform
Commercial Code to Natural Gas Contracts, 36 OIL & GAS TAx. Q. 67 (1987); L.M. McCorkle, Jr. &
Thomas 0. Ruby, Contracts for the Sale of Gas-A Uniform Commercial Code Analysis, 7 E. MIN. L.
INST. § 15.01 (1986); Theodore M. Smith, How the Uniform Commercial Code Applies to Natural
Resources Transactions, 33 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 5.01 (1988).
Producers argue that pursuant to UCC §§ 2-719(l)(a) and 1-102(3), the contracting parties
intended to include an alternate damage remedy equivalent to the volume deficiency times the con-
tract price, in substitution of an otherwise applicable UCC damage provision. Prenalta Corp. v.
Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 944 F.2d 677, 687-90 (10th Cir. 1991) (rejecting UCC measure of
damages in take-or-pay case). This issue is currently before the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Forest
Oil Corp. v. ONEOK, Inc., No. 71,582 (Okla. filed Aug. 24, 1988). The UCC embodies a strong
policy of freedom of contract, especially between merchants. Louisiana Nev. Transit Co. v. Mara-
thon Oil Co., 770 F. Supp. 325 (W.D. La. 1991) (enforcing the producer's contractual remedy of
canceling the contract upon buyer's failure to take or pay); Frank Le Roux, Inc. v. Burns, 480 P.2d
213 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that a contract may contain remedies in addition to those in the
UCC, provided alternative remedies are not unconscionable or commercially unreasonable); 1
JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PRACTITIONER'S EDI-
TION § 3-2 (3d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1991); Charles Bunn, Freedom of Contract Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 2 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 59 (1960).
20. See Prenalta Corp., 944 F.2d at 690-91 (holding that § 2-708(1) did not provide an adequate
remedy when the market price exceeded the contract price in a take-and-pay case and therefore § 2-
708(2) was appropriate). See generally Robert Childres & Robert K. Burgess, Seller's Remedies:
The Primacy of UCC2-708(2), 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 833 (1973) (discussing seller's lost profit remedy
under § 2-708(2)); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Measuring Sellers' Damages: The Lost-Prof-
its Puzzle, 31 STAN. L. REv. 323 (1979) (determining when compensation requires the award of lost
volume profits); Richard E. Speidel & Kendall 0. Clay, Seller's Recovery of Overhead Under UCC
Section 2-708(2). Economic Cost Theory and Contract Remedial Policy, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 681
(1972) (discussing policy considerations behind § 2-708(2)).
Theoretically, the producer could sue under § 2-708(2) as a "lost volume" seller and seek to
recover his lost profits. See 4 RONALD A. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-708:21 to
:29 (3d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1990) (generally discussing lost volume sellers); 3 WILLIAM D. HAWK-
LAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-708:04 (1984 & Supp. 1991) (illustrating lost vol-
ume seller damage calculation).
The complexity of applying § 2-708(2) to an alternative performance contract such as a take-or-
pay agreement has not been explored. Should the "pay" alternative be employed, § 2-708(2) yields a
result comparable to the contract remedy of contract price times the deficiency amount. See Colo-
rado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 661 F. Supp. 1448, 1477-78 (D. Wyo.
1987) (holding § 2-708(2) was an appropriate measure of damages where no market for the gas
existed as a result of the buyer's refusal to transport the gas; buyer effectively precluded seller from
selling to others), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 885 F.2d 683 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
441 (1990); cf. Prenalta Corp., 944 F.2d at 690-91 (holding § 2-708(2) applicable to take-and-pay
contracts).
Alternatively, a producer may seek an action for the price (deficiency payments) pursuant to
§ 2-709. Under this remedy, however, the pipeline would retain all contractual recoupment rights.
See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Decker Coal Co., 653 F. Supp. 841, 843-45 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(rejecting application of § 2-708(2) to a coal contract containing provisions analogous to a take-or-
pay clause, and awarding the seller the price under § 2-709(1) subject to buyer's rights to mine coal
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breach could pressure producers to renegotiate the contract in favor of
the pipeline. The producer, bound by its exclusive dedication, would be
unable to sell to other parties, a remedy contemplated by the UCC.21
Second, the producers argued that the market price element of the sec-
tion 2-708(1) formula was ambiguous. Was the market price the spot-
market price or a fictional long-term contract price?22
Additionally, producers argued that the use of section 2-708(1)
would give the pipeline an unlimited right of recoupment, a right not
contemplated by the parties.23  Typically, pipelines must recoup gas
within five years of the deficiency payment. Damages under section 2-
708(1) would grant the pipelines an unlimited recoupment and defeat the
in the future). See generally 4 ANDERSON, supra note 20, § 2-709; 3 HAWKLAND, supra note 20,
§ 2-709; John S. Herbrand, Annotation, Seller's Recovery of Price of Goods from Buyer Under UCC
§ 2-709, 90 A.L.R.3D 1141 (1979 & Supp. 1991). The Oklahoma Supreme Court, however, strictly
construes the price remedy and limits its application to the specific instances enumerated in § 2-709.
French v. Sotheby & Co., 470 P.2d 318, 322-23 (Okla. 1970).
21. U.C.C. § 2-706. See generally, 4 ANDERSON, supra note 20, § 2-706; 3 HAWKLAND, supra
note 20, § 2-706; Roy R. Anderson, Plunging the Depths of the Seller's Resale Remedy Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 50 J. AIR L. & CoM. 411 (1985). In Sabine Corp. v. ONG W., Inc., 725
F. Supp. 1157, 1186-87 (W.D. Okla. 1989), the court discussed in passing the resale remedy in the
context of a take-or-pay contract. However, it did not reach the issue of whether a producer must
mitigate damages by attempting to sell gas to third parties in contravention of an exclusive dedica-
tion clause.
22. In Manchester Pipeline Corp., 862 F.2d at 1446-48, the court found that the appropriate
damages for buyer's breach of a long-term gas contract was the contract price less the market price
of a similar long-term contract determined at the time the seller learned of buyer's repudiation. Id.
at 1448. The court rejected a damage calculation based on the spot market price. Id Application of
the court's damage formula is impractical because a freely negotiated, comparable contract rarely
exists. See 4 SUMMERS, supra note 15, § 762 (discussing new forms of gas contracts); cf Pierce,
supra note 9, § 1.03El][d] (positing that Manchester assumes the producer would be able to obtain a
higher price for gas committed under a long-term contract than the spot market price). But cf I
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 19, § 7-18, at 34 (Supp. 1991) (approving Manchester, but not
discussing the problem of finding a similar long-term contract).
In some instances, the long-term contract price may be less than the spot market price, given
the relative current bargaining strengths of the parties. Therefore, the spot market price is likely a
more reliable indicator than a fictitious "equivalent" long-term contract. Manchester should be lim-
ited to cases where damages for anticipatory repudiation are sought under § 2-610. Moreover, the
existence of a market-out clause further distinguished Manchester from a typical take-or-pay case.
See Manchester Pipeline Corp., 862 F.2d at 1441 n.1, 1443-49. The question of what is the proper
measure of damages for anticipatory repudiation of a take-or-pay contract has been certified to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court. See Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Arkla, Inc., No. CIV-89-993-R
(W.D. Okla. May 17, 1991) (order certifying a question of state law).
23. Courts have consistently rejected the argument that the pipeline's inability to profitably
exercise recoupment rights justifies judicial relief on their behalf. See, ag., Universal Resources
Corp. v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 813 F.2d 77 (rejecting argument that the pipeline's breach was
justified because the producer did not have enough gas production over and above contact volume to
satisfy deficiency), reh'g denied, 821 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1987); Sabine Corp., 725 F. Supp. at 1172-84
(holding pipeline was obligated to take or pay for gas even though the market price severely declined
since execution of the contract); Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 595 F.
Supp. 497, 500-01 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (holding that public policy against planned breach of contract
mandated enforcement of take-or-pay clause).
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producers' expectation and the parties' contemplation that the pipelines
may pay twice for the same gas.24 Finally, producers contended that
take-or-pay contracts were peculiar to the natural gas industry and did
not easily fit within the parameters of section 2-708(1).25
In addition to actions for past due deficiency payments, producers
sought to increase their recovery. For example, producers attempted to
recover interest on past due deficiency payments. However, recovery
normally consisted of interest provided by statute,26 if any, because natu-
ral gas contracts rarely provided for interest on past due payments. Be-
cause the pipeline often obtained an interest rate higher than the
24. See UniversalResources Corp., 813 F.2d at 80 ("The definition of makeup gas contemplates
... that the buyer may never receive gas for which he has already paid."); Lone Star Gas Co. v.
McCarthy, 605 S.W.2d 653, 656-57 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
("[Under the normal take or pay clause, the buyer takes a risk that it might not be able to make up a
deficiency within the make-up period. Thus, if the gas is not made-up, then the buyer effectively
purchases the gas a second time."). In effect, a recoupment period reflects the parties' allocation of
the risks. Hanover Petroleum Corp. v. Tenneco Inc., 521 So. 2d 1234, 1241 (La. Ct. App.) (holding
that take-or-pay provision resulted from the parties' bargaining over allocation of risks), cert. denied,
526 So. 2d 800 (La. 1988); R.3B. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 813 P.2d 14, 24
(Okla. Ct. App. 1990) ("[T]he parties to the contract are assumed to have allocated the risk in a
take-or-pay clause."). Therefore, the producer should not have a duty to mitigate damages by selling
gas to a third party (even if the pipeline would permit this). Stack v. Tenneco, Inc., No. E83-
0143(L), slip op. at 9 n.7 (E.D. Miss. Oct. 23, 1987); ANR Pipeline Co. v. Union Oil Co., No. CIV-
89-533-R, slip op. at 8-10 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 16, 1989).
Applying § 2-708(1) should yield a similar result because no recoupment rights exist in years
when no deficiency payments are made. See R.J.B. Gas Pipeline Co., 813 P.2d at 24-25; RIB Gas
Pipeline Co. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 813 P.2d 1, 11 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989).
25. UCC § 2-708 is limited to setting forth the measure of recovery for non-acceptance or repu-
diation by the buyer. When neither non-acceptance nor repudiation is present, UCC § 2-708 does
not apply. See, e.g., Beco, Inc. v. Minnechaug Golf Course, Inc., 256 A.2d 522, 525-26 (Conn. Cir.
Ct. 1968). Typically, a producer does not sue a pipeline for non-acceptance because the pipeline is
specifically permitted by the take-or-pay clause to not take the gas. E.g., Transcontinental Gas Pipe
Line Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd., 474 U.S. 409, 412 (1986); Prenalta Corp., 944 F.2d at 680; Golsen
v. ONG W., Inc., 756 P.2d 1209, 1210 (Okla. 1988). Repudiation by the buyer triggers a § 2-708(1)
remedy only if the seller brings a claim for anticipatory repudiation. The producer normally seeks
relief only for the pipeline's failure to make deficiency payments due under the contract, and not for
failure to take the gas or for repudiation of future payments.
26. Eg., OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 22 (1981) (suit for breach of obligation to pay money). In
RJ.B. Gas Pipeline Co., 813 P.2d at 24, the court found this section inapplicable to take-or-pay
damages.
Producers should provide for interest on late payments in the contract. Such provisions are
enforceable. Eg., OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 266, 275 (1981); First Nat. Bank v. Citizens & S. Bank,
651 F.2d 696, 699 (10th Cir. 1981). Similarly, the contract should provide attorneys' fees for the
prevailing party in a suit to enforce the contract. In some states, the absence of such a provision
precludes the award of attorneys' fees. In Oklahoma, a gas purchase contract is a sale of goods and
thus subject to the attorney fee provision in OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 936 (1981). See R..B. Gas
Pipeline Co., 813 P.2d at 24. A fee provision in the contract is still advisable because under fee
statutes, a court may sometimes reduce a fee request to an amount that it deems "reasonable." Cf
Bishop v. Franks, 107 P.2d 358, 359-60 (Okla. 1940) (noting distinction between a court in equity
awarding fees based on quantum meruit and fees under a contract provision).
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statutory amount, it was victorious each day payment was delayed. Pro-
ducers also asserted RICO,27 anti-trust,2 and tortious breach of contract
claims2 9 against the pipeline, all of which would have supported en-
hanced recovery. However, all such claims were universally unsuccess-
ful. In addition, producers occasionally attempted to recover under the
doctrine of anticipatory repudiation."0 In exceptional situations produ-
cers sought injunctive and provisional remedies.
V. THE PIPELINE'S "GENERIC" DEFENSES
Past take-or-pay litigation focused not on the producer's prima facie
case for breach of contract by the pipeline, but rather on the pipeline's
excuses for breach.3 Labeled "generic defenses," 32 the excuses applied
27. See, eg., Samson Resources Co. v. Northern Natural Gas Co., No. 85-C-911-E (N.D. Okla.
July 1, 1987) (granting motion to dismiss RICO claim); Cayman Exploration Corp. v. United Gas
Pipeline Corp., No. 86-C-123-B, slip op. at 16-26 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 5, 1987) (same). See generally
Denis Binder, The Potential Application of RICO in the Natural Resources/Environmental Law Con-
text, 63 DENV. U. L. REv. 535 (1986).
28. See, eg., Cayman Exploration Corp., No. 86-C-123-B, slip op. at 6-16 (granting motion to
dismiss federal antitrust claim); Garshman v. Universal Resources Holding, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 1359,
1367-69 (D.N.J. 1986) (dismissing federal antitrust claim that pipeline coerced producers to renego-
tiate take-or-pay contracts by threatening economic reprisals), aff'd, 824 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1987); cf
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. of Am. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 885 F.2d 683, 691-97 (10th Cir.
1989) (reversing lower court judgment in favor of natural gas seller on antitrust monopoly count
against transporter because seller failed to establish dangerous probability that transporter would
monopolize the long-distance transportation market), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 441 (1990); Illinois ex
rel Hartigan v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 730 F. Supp. 826 (C.D. Ill. 1990) (unsuccessful suit by
state against pipeline), aff'd, 935 F.2d 1469 (7th Cir. 1991). See generally William C. Holmes et al.,
Dealing with Pipeline Monopolies: The Antitrust Alternative, 37 INsr. ON OIL & GAs L. & TAX'N
§ 7.01 (1986) (discussing antitrust principles of third party access to pipeline transportation
systems).
29. RJB Gas Pipeline Co. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 813 P.2d 1, 11-12 (Okla. Ct. App.
1989). But see American Nat'l Petroleum Co. v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 798 S.W.2d
274 (Tex. 1990) (upholding punitive damages against pipeline and concluding that pipeline took
unfair advantage of smaller companies). See generally Lawrence A. Towers & Peter L. Gardon,
Circumvention ofArticle 2: Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract, 19 UCC L.J. 291 (1987) (discuss-
ing tort remedies to breach of contract in a commercial setting).
30. Producer's anticipatory repudiation claims were based on UCC § 2-610. See, e.g., El Paso
Natural Gas Co. v. G.H.R. Energy Corp., No. 85-09329 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Harris County Mar. 21,
1988) (jury verdict of $536 million based on anticipatory repudiation by the pipeline); cf Kaiser-
Francis Oil Co. v. Producer's Gas Co., No. 83-C-400-B (N.D. Okla. June 19, 1985) (granting sum-
mary judgment against producer on claim of anticipatory repudiation).
31. See Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. ANR Pipeline Co., No. H-86-2189, 1987 WL 5677
(S.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 1987) (noting that take-or-pay defenses are commonly asserted against a standard
industry contract); John S. Dzienkowski, Professional Responsibility Trends for Lawyers and Land-
men in Natural Resources Transactions, 36 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 2.01, § 2.04[7], at 2-46 to
-47 (1990) (positing that take-or-pay defenses are largely independent of contract language). After
generic defenses proved largely unsuccessful, pipelines increasingly relied on contract-specific de-
fenses. See Pierce, supra note 9, § 1.03[2][c].
32. Medina, Take or Litigate, supra note 3, at 210, reprinted in 24 PuB. LAND & RESOURCES L.
DIG. at 192.
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industry-wide and were largely unrelated to specific gas purchase con-
tracts. Although pipelines failed with generic defenses, an understanding
of the defenses is necessary to construct effective natural gas contract
clauses.
A. NGPA Defense
A common defense asserted by buyers in natural gas contract litiga-
tion involved the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 ("NGPA"). 33 The
NGPA established maximum prices for certain categories of natural gas.
Buyers contended that deficiency payments for gas not taken would effec-
tively raise the price for gas taken above the NGPA's maximum lawful
price. This defense was universally rejected and is of historic interest
only because natural gas prices are almost completely deregulated.34
B. Mutual Mistake Defense
Pipelines often contended that their breach was justified because the
gas purchase contract was formed on the basis of a mutual mistake of the
parties. Generally, pipelines claimed that the parties mistook either the
projected economic conditions of the natural gas market or the impact of
governmental regulation on the natural gas industry. The courts rejected
this defense on a number of grounds.35 First, pipelines were unable to
establish the mutuality of the mistake. Second, pipelines assumed the
risk of a decline in the price of natural gas; therefore, the defense was
inapplicable. Thiid, a mutual mistake regarding predictions of future
conduct was not the type of mistake for which the courts could grant
relief. Lastly, the defense carried with it a higher burden of proof which
pipelines were unable to sustain.36
33. Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1988)).
34. E-g., Kaiser-Francis Oil Co. v. Producer's Gas Co., 870 F.2d 563, 570 (10th Cir. 1989)
(rejecting assertion of the NGPA defense); Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 893 F.2d 349, 357-59
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (same); Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 51 F.E.R.C. 61,322 (1990); see
Pierce, supra note 9, § 1.03[2][b] (discussing NGPA defense).
35. See, ag., Sabine Corp. v. ONG W., Inc., 725 F. Supp. 1157, 1187-89 (W.D. Okla. 1989)
(striking defense because evidence did not show that mistake was mutual); Resources Inv. Corp. v.
Enron Corp., 669 F. Supp. 1038, 1042-43 (D. Colo. 1987) (holding a mutual mistake defense was not
applicable to mistaken predictions of future economic conditions).
36. See, eg., Sabine Corp., 725 F. Supp. at 1187-89 (in Oklahoma, the burden of proof is a clear
and convincing evidentiary standard for reformation or rescission based on mutual mistake). But cf
Wagner & Brown II v. ONEOK, Inc., No. CIV-89-943-R, slip op. at 22-23 (V.D. Okla. Mar. 29,
1990) (allowing mistake defense to survive motion to dismiss but narrowing its scope). See generally
2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 9.3 (1990) (discussing mutual mistake
defense to enforcement of a contract).
[Vol. 27:283
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C. Public Policy Defense
The public policy defense was used by public utilities and their inter-
mediate purchasers as a defense to enforcement of take-or-pay obliga-
tions. Public utilities contended that take-or-pay clauses were against
public policy because the consumer would suffer higher utility prices re-
sulting from deficiency payments if the clauses were enforced. The pub-
lic utilities argued that higher prices would lead to lower consumption,
then to less revenues, necessitating still higher rates, further reducing
revenues and so on, thereby creating damage to the rate-making struc-
ture.3v Courts rejected the defense because the deficiency payments
would not necessarily lead to higher consumer prices. Also, courts uni-
versally held that the freedom to contract outweighed any potential ad-
verse effects on utility consumers.38
D. Penalty Defense
Buyers argued that the take-or-pay clause in the gas purchase con-
tract constituted a penalty because the central feature of the clause was
the requirement that the buyer pay for gas not taken. Courts, however,
universally held that take-or-pay clauses do not provide a punishment for
breach, rather an alternative method of performance.39 Under a typical
37. This so-called "death spiral" proceeds "whereby the need to raise price[s] to cover average
cost results in a loss of sales sufficiently large that price must be raised again-and so on, until the
market must be abandoned." J. Stephen Henderson, Price Discrimination Limits in Relation to the
Death Spiral, ENERGY J., July 1986, at 33, 34. The death spiral theory fails because it does not
consider that stockholders of the utility should suffer the loss, not the producer or consumer. See
Clyde E. Milligan, Anatomy of a Gas Purchase Contract, 23 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 771, 775
(1977); cf Madelyn M. Huffinire, Section 2-615 and Corporate Accountability, 13 UCC L.J. 256
(1981). For an example of this alternative, see Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal
Co., 799 F.2d 265, 274-76 (7th Cir. 1986) (refusing to allow the costs associated with long-term
contracts to pass through to the ratepayers).
38. See, eg., Sabine Corp., 725 F. Supp. at 1182-83 (upholding the freedom to contract and
finding no evidence of contravention of public policy in take-or-pay clause); Benson Mineral Group,
Inc. v. Northern Natural Gas Co., No. 86-1903, slip op. at 18-20 (D. Kan. April 29, 1988); Day v.
Tenneco, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 233, 237 (S.D. Miss. 1988) (noting that even if the take-or-pay clause
raises the price of gas for consumers, the clause "would not for that reason violate public policy");
Resources Inv. Corp., 669 F. Supp. at 1040 ("[E]nsuring that parties adhere to the terms of contracts
they have entered into far outweighs the purported interest in protecting [the buyer] from agree-
ments they now perceive to have been unwise.").
39. See, eg., Prenalta Corp. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 944 F.2d 677, 688-90 (10th Cir.
1991); Wagner & Brown II, No. CIV-89-943-R, slip op. at 20-22; ANR Pipeline Co. v. Union Oil
Co., No. CIV-89-533-R, slip op. at 1-3 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 16, 1989); Sabine Corp., 725 F. Supp. at
1184 (noting that deficiency payments are an alternate performance to presently taking and paying
for gas, not a penalty for breach); Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., No. 7159,
1985 WL 44696, at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 10, 1985); cf. 1 WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 19, § 7-18
(rejecting application of liquidated damages theory so as to preclude enforcement of take-or-pay
contracts). See generally 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 36, § 12.18.
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take-or-pay clause, the buyer had the choice of taking and paying for the
annual minimum volume during an accounting year or paying for the
annual minimum volume during the accounting year and taking the gas
paid for during a later accounting year. Furthermore, if the take-or-pay
clause were a penalty, payment of that penalty would extinguish further
obligations of the pipeline under the contract. This result was clearly
contrary to the pipelines' continuing obligations under the contract;
therefore, this defense usually failed.
E. Unconscionability Defense
Under the authority of UCC section 2-302, a court has the power to
refuse to enforce any part of a contract that it finds unconscionable. In
defending alleged breaches pipelines argued that take-or-pay provisions
were unconscionable parts of the contract and resulted from unequal bar-
gaining powers of the parties. Pipelines theorized that producers used
enormous bargaining power created by the great gas shortages in the
1970s to force pipelines to accept adhesion contracts.
Courts rejected this defense on several grounds. First, pipelines, not
producers, drafted most gas purchase contracts. Second, despite the gas
shortages, pipelines retained significant marketing and negotiating lever-
age. Third, unconscionability played a very limited role in commercial
contracts.' Finally, the defense failed on the threshold requirement that
the unconscionability must be determined in light of the circumstances
existing at the time of the contract execution, not at the time of the dis-
pute.41 Most take-or-pay contracts were part of a bargained for ex-
change: the producer's long-term commitment of a gas supply for the
pipeline's guarantee of a continuous stream of revenue.42
40. U.C.C. § 2-302(1), IA U.L.A. 15 (1989). See Jane P. Mallor, Unconscionability in Con-
tracts Between Merchants, 40 Sw. L.J. 1065 (1986); 2 ANDERSON, supra note 20, § 2-302:39; 2
HAWKLAND, supra note 20, § 2-302:06; cf. Gerald B. Greenwald, Natural Gas Contracts Under
Stress Price, Quantity and Take or Pay, 5 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 1 (1987).
41. U.C.C. § 2-302(1). See 2 ANDERSON, supra note 20, § 2-302:47 (determining unconsciona-
bility as of the time of contracting); 2 HAWELAND, supra note 20, § 2-302:05 (discussing limitations
of the unconscionability doctrine).
42. "It should make a lawyer blush to stand before a court and argue that a contract negotiated
by gas pipeline executives (with the assistance of counsel) contained a clause that was unconsciona-
ble at the time it was written." 1 WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 19, § 7-18, at 33 (Supp. 1991).
See, eg., Resources Inv. Corp., 669 F. Supp. at 1042 (D. Colo. 1987) (rejecting unconscionability);
Benson Mineral Group, Inc., No. 86-1903, slip op. at 18-20 (finding that contract was not uncon-
scionable at the time it was executed); Brumark Corp. v. Northern Natural Gas Co., No. C-87-46
(Okla. Dist. Ct. Roger Mills County Feb. 21, 1989).
[Vol. 27:283
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F. Commercial Impracticability Defense
Buyers also sought refuge from their contractual obligations under
the provisions of UCC section 2-615. That section excuses the seller and
buyer4" when performance is impracticable because of the occurrence of
a contingency that was not contemplated by the parties at the time of
contracting.
The impracticability defense was also unsuccessful.' Courts held
that governmental or regulatory intervention in natural gas sales was
foreseeable at the time of contracting and not a contingency that would
give rise to a commercial impracticability defense. Courts also deter-
mined that, in the absence of a protective clause, pipelines assumed the
risk of governmental regulation and declining markets. Moreover, in or-
der to raise commercial impracticability as a defense, the pipeline was
required to avail itself of any regulatory avenues of relief. Finally, be-
cause the take-or-pay contract was an alternative contract, the pipeline
had to establish that it was commercially impracticable to both take the
gas and pay for the gas not taken.
G. Conservation Defense
Pipelines, principally in Oklahoma and Texas, attempted to use con-
servation laws as a defense to take-or-pay obligations.45 In Oklahoma,
such reliance was unsuccessful for interstate pipelines because of federal
preemption of state law.' Other Oklahoma pipelines unsuccessfully
43. Although UCC § 2-615 expressly includes only sellers, the provisions were judicially ex-
tended to buyers. Lawrance v. Elmore Bean Warehouse, Inc., 702 P.2d 930, 932 (Idaho Ct. App.
1985); Nora Springs Coop. v. Brandau, 247 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 1976); Golsen v. ONG W., Inc., 756
P.2d 1209, 1221 (Okla. 1988) (Kauger, J., concurring).
44. "The impracticability argument has been equally unavailing for the [pipeline companies]."
I WTrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 19, § 7-18, at 33 (Supp. 1991). See Wagner & Brown II v.
ONEOK, Inc., No. CIV 89-943-R, slip op. at 6-12 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 29, 1990); Sabine Corp. v.
ONG W., Inc., 725 F. Supp. 1157, 1172-78 (W.D. Okla. 1989). Cases applying UCC § 2-615 are
collected in Jane M. Draper, Annotation, Impracticability of Performance of Sales Contract as De-
fense Under UCC § 2-615, 93 A.L.R.3D 584 (1979); cf Medina, A Further Status Report, supra note
3, at 408 n.108. See generally 2 FARswoRTH, supra note 36, §§ 9.5, 9.6 (discussing commercial
impracticability under UCC § 2-615). For non-UCC cases that hold inability to pay cannot be ex-
cused under the doctrine of impracticability, see Deibel v. Deibel, 512 F. Supp. 135 (E.D. Mo. 1981);
Haun v. King, 690 S.W.2d 869 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).
45. See Medina et al., Take or Litigate, supra note 3, at 242-52, reprinted in 24 PUB. LAND &
RESOURCES L. DIG. at 249-54.
46. ANR Pipeline Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 643 F. Supp. 419 (W.D. Okla. 1986), aff'd, 860
F.2d 1571 (10th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1051 (1989).
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raised waste and rateable take regulation defenses.4 7 In Texas, the nomi-
nation procedure used by the Railroad Commission invited pipeline ma-
nipulation. By nominating very little gas over a period of time, a pipeline
was able to reduce the amount of gas the producer would be allowed to
produce from a well. The pipeline argued the limited allowable was the
basis on which to calculate the minimum quantity for take-or-pay pur-
poses. Texas courts split on the issue of whether the minimum quantity
is affected by nomination. The majority rejected the defense.4"
H. Force Majeure Defense
Force majeure is a generic defense that depends upon contract lan-
guage for success. In past litigation, pipelines argued two conditions of
force majeure: a drastically different natural gas market and intervening
governmental regulations. Courts vigorously employed the canon of
ejusdem generis to narrow the scope of force majeure clauses in natural
gas contracts. In addition, courts required pipelines to establish force
majeure for all the alternative means of performances, not simply the
alternative of presently taking the gas. For the most part, the force
majeure defense was unsuccessful.49
47. Eg., Sabine Corp., 725 F. Supp. at 1183-84; Panhandle E. Pipeline Co. v. Corporation
Comm'n, 715 F. Supp. 1055 (W.D. Okla. 1989); Golsen, 756 P.2d at 1214-20; Brumark Corp. v.
Northern Natural Gas Co., No. C-87-46, slip op. at 8 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Roger Mills County Feb. 21,
1989).
48. For cases disallowing the defense, see Oakridge Energy, Inc. v. Lone Star Gas Co., No.
130,044-C ('ex. Dist. Ct. Wichita County June 18, 1990); Brown v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., No.
34,578 (Tex. Dist. CL Midland County July 12, 1988); Wagner & Brown II v. Valero Transmission
Co., No. 36,160 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Midland County May 4, 1987); Hamilton Bros. Oil Co. v. Lone Star
Gas Co., No. 86-233 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Cooke County Sept. 22, 1987).
For cases allowing the defense, see Danden Petroleum., Inc. v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 615
F. Supp. 1093 (N.D. Tex. 1985); Lone Star Gas Co. v. Lively Energy & Dev. Corp., No. 04-87-
00261-CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio Oct. 11, 1989, no writ) (finding issue properly one for the jury,
which found for the pipeline). See also A. Scott Anderson, The Texas Approach to Gas Proration and
Ratable Take, 57 U. CoLo. L. REv. 199 (1986).
49. See, e.g., Kaiser-Francis Oil Co. v. Producer's Gas Co., 870 F.2d 563, 565-66 (10th Cir.
1989); Conn Energy, Inc. v. Sea Robin Pipeline Co., No. 89-5436, 1990 WL 62020 (E.D. La. May 9,
1990); Sabine Corp., 725 F. Supp. at 1162-72; United States v. Panhandle E. Corp. 693 F. Supp. 88,
95-99 (D. Del. 1988), aff'd, 868 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Pierce, supra note 9, § 1.03[2][a]
(discussing Sabine and Kaiser-Francis); cf Esplanade Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Templeton Energy Income
Corp., 889 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding force majeure clause did not excuse performance of
buyer because precipitous drop in oil prices made performance merely unprofitable, not impossible).
But see Exxon Corp. v. ANR Pipeline Co., No. H-89-1011 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 1990) (granting
partial summary adjudication to pipeline).
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VI. SPECIFIC CONTRACT CLAUSE LITIGATION: THE PAST AND ITS
LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
Future gas purchase contracts should be drafted only after analyz-
ing the impact of specific clauses and the construction of such clauses in
past litigation. 0 The outcome of past litigation, which focused on the
generic defenses, was largely independent of contract language. Now,
after generic defenses have proven largely unsuccessful, the outcome of
take-or-pay litigation depends mainly upon the language in the contract.
This section of the paper examines specific provisions of a gas purchase
contract that have impacted a pipeline's take-or-pay obligation. Exami-
nation of these provisions will aid the drafting of future contracts,
whether or not a take-or-pay clause is utilized. Scrutiny of these specific
contract provisions reveals one basic truth: a party is best protected by
strict, meticulous and scrupulous compliance with the provisions of the
contract. Even the most inane and innocuous sounding provision can
rear its ugly head and severely bite a party.51
A. Force Majeure Clause
Typically, force majeure clauses were not negotiated. Instead, they
were buried deep in the boilerplate provisions of long-term gas contracts.
One would assume that force majeure provisions would have benefitted
the pipelines because they drafted most gas purchase contracts.5 2 This
has not been the case. In fact, the object lesson from force majeure dis-
putes must be that boilerplate provisions oftentimes fail. The drafter
must put careful thought into the preparation of the force majeure clause
to make it effective.5 3
50. After unsuccessful resolution of the generic defenses, pipelines returned to the specific con-
tract for relief. Pierce, supra note 9, § 1.0312][c]. The pipelines often found protection in the terms
of the contract. Id.
51. Id. § 1.0312].
In the take-or-pay arena, both sides have been surprised to learn the effect of their
entire gas contract. Purchasers have been surprised to learn that, absent express contract
language, courts will not rescue them from dramatic market shifts. Producers have been
equally surprised to learn that courts will give effect to "all that pipeline boilerplate" which
often substantially reduces or eliminates the purchaser's take-or-pay obligations.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
52. The buyer, in most cases a pipeline or a utility, had prepared the gas purchase contract.
Coquina Oil Corp. v. Transwestern Pipeline Co., No. 86-562-M Civil (D.N.M. Sept. 19, 1986), ap-
peal dismissed, 825 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1987); Patrick J. McCarthy, The Purchaser's Considerations
in the Negotiation and Drafiing of Gas Contracts, 19 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 237, 240-41 (1974).
53. While most pipelines have not practiced careful drafting, ANR Pipeline Company has en-
joyed success with its force majeure defense. See, eg., Exxon Corp., No. H-89-1011 (granting
ANR's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of force majeure); Hamilton Bros. Oil Co.
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Many pipelines' claims of force majeure failed on the requirement to
give notice. A force majeure clause contains three basic elements: the
requisite notice to be given, the definition of the types of activities or
situations that would constitute force majeure, and the effect of those
activities on the parties' obligations. Courts have consistently ruled that
the notice specified in the force majeure clause was a condition precedent
to the existence of the defense. Without such specified notice, the defense
would fail as a matter of law.54 A producer responding to a force
majeure assertion is better able to show lack of the requisite notice if the
requirements of notice are detailed and exacting. Thus, a producer might
insert a clause similar to that below:
The party asserting a condition of force majeure as defined herein shall
provide written notice by certified mail (return receipt requested) to
the other party within five days of such condition's occurrence. This
written notice shall specify (1) the nature of the force majeure condi-
tion, (2) the length of time such condition is expected to continue, and
(3) the efforts expended and to be expended by the party claiming a
condition of force majeure to remedy or alleviate the condition of force
majeure.
Courts have narrowly construed events covered by force majeure in
favor of the producer. Pipelines often attempted to fit the event of falling
gas prices into force majeure clause language such as "failure of market."
v. ANR Pipeline Co., No. CIV-88-132-A (W.D. Okla. Feb. 21, 1989) (allowing force majeure de-
fense to survive producer's motion for summary judgment); Burkhart Petroleum Corp. v. ANR
Pipeline Co., No. 87-C-257-C (N.D. Okla. June 30, 1988) (allowing force majeure defense). Indeed,
ANR has received favorable trial decisions on its defense. See Dyco Petroleum Corp. v. ANR Pipe-
line Co., No. 86-C-1097-E (N.D. Okla. Aug. 29, 1990) (jury verdict largely favorable to ANR);
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. ANR Pipeline Co., 768 S.W.2d 777, 781-82 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1989, no writ) (FERC order no. 380 allowing pipeline customers to refuse to pay pipeline
"minimum bills" constituted force majeure and excused pipelines take-or-pay obligations to pro-
ducer). ANR had precise contract language directly tying the take-or-pay deficiency clause to the
force majeure provision:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, on any day when deliv-
eries or takes are affected by force majeure and the volumes of gas well gas delivered are
less than the applicable daily contract quantity, the daily contract quantity hereunder shall
be deemed to be the actual volume delivered and purchased on each such day.
Ird at 780 (quoting FERC order no. 380, art. V, § 8). See also Pierce, supra note 9, § 1.03[2][a]
(discussing ANR). ANR's precise facts were not easily duplicated by other pipelines. Transcript of
Hearing on Motions for Summary Judgment at 8-10, Quinton Little Co. v. Lone Star Gas Co., No.
37-427-C (E.D. Okla. Jan. 5, 1989).
54. International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Llano, Inc., 770 F.2d 879, 885 (10th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986); Superior Oil Co. v. Transco Energy Co., 616 F. Supp. 98, 108-09
(W.D. La. 1985); Sabine Corp. v. ONG W., Inc., 725 F. Supp. 1157, 1168-69 (W.D. Okla. 1989); see
Wagner & Brown II v. ONEOK, Inc., No. CIV 89-943-R, slip op. at 3-6 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 29, 1990)
(striking force majeure defense because pipeline sent notice of force majeure to the operator, not to
the seller as required by the contract).
18
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 27 [1991], Iss. 2, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol27/iss2/7
TAKE OR PAY
Courts, however, interpreted such force majeure clauses under the doc-
trine of ejusdem generis55 and held that falling prices did not constitute
"failure of market," but simply made operations unprofitable. Although
pipelines lost most force majeure arguments,5 6 clearer contract language
might have prevented the disputes and attendant litigation expenses.
Thus, a party is wise to carefully consider the events covered by a force
majeure clause. A producer desiring to exclude market fluctuations or
governmental activities from covered events, might use the following
language:
The term "force majeure" shall be strictly and narrowly limited to
only natural, operational, and mechanical events not within the con-
trol of the party claiming suspension, and which by the exercise of due
diligence, such party is unable to prevent or overcome, such as storms,
floods, breakages or accidents to machinery or lines of pipe, freezing of
wells or pipes, or necessity for making repairs and the like. In no event
shall force majeure be defined or construed to include events arising
out of, relating to, or caused by governmental, market, or economic
conditions.
The third element of a force majeure clause specifies which duties
are suspended in the event of force majeure. For example, if a seller had
a very strong negotiating position with a buyer, the seller might insist on
language such as:
55. See, eg., Wheeling Valley Coal Corp. v. Mead, 186 F.2d 219, 223 (4th Cir. 1950); Consoli-
dated Gas Transmission Co. v. Ashland Exploration, Inc., No. 87-C-103-1, slip op. at 8 (W. Va. Cir.
Ct. Harrison County Oct. 13, 1988). See generally 2 FARNswoRTH, supra note 36, § 9.9a; 18 SA-
MUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNTRAcTs § 1968, at 209-11 (3d ed. 1978);
Edmund M. Carney, The Nature and Extent of the Excuse Provided by a Force Majeure Event Under
a Coal Supply Agreement, 4 E. MIN. L. INsT. § 11.01, § 11.02[1][c][ii] (1983); Gregory P. Williams,
Coping with Acts of God, Strikes, and Other Delights-The Use of Force Majeure Provisions in Mining
Contracts, 22 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 433, 434-36 (1976). For application in a non-gas context,
see United States v. Brooks-Callaway Co., 318 U.S. 120, 122-24 (1943).
56. See Kaiser-Francis Oil Co. v. Producer's Gas Co., 870 F.2d 563, 566 (10th Cir. 1989) ("The
change in the general or relative resale price of gas does not constitute a 'partial failure of gas
demand' [under the force majeure clause] which would relieve [the pipeline] of its obligations to take
or pay."); Golsen v. ONG W., Inc., 756 P.2d 1209, 1212-14 (Okla. 1988) (holding that inability to
sell gas at a profit does not constitute "failure of gas supply or market," an event described in the
force majeure clause). But cf Kodiak 1981 Drilling Partnership v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 736
S.W.2d 715, 724 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that failure of a market
for the gas relieved purchaser of take-or-pay obligations). Commentators have criticized Kodiak.
See, e-g., Discussion Notes, 99 Oil & Gas Rep. (MB) 631-32 (Aug. 1989). For analysis of Golsen's
significance, see Robert N. Barnes & Randall J. Wood, The Allocation of Risk in Gas Purchase
Contracts After Golsen v. ONG Western, Inc., 13 OKLA. CITY U. L. Rav. 503 (1988); David L.
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Each party hereto shall be excused from performing under this agree-
ment, except for buyer's obligation to make payments accrued hereun-
der, prior to, during, or after the occurrence of the cause relied upon,
to the extent ....
On the other hand, a buyer might insist that the force majeure excuse all
its obligations except for the payment of gas taken prior to the occur-
rence of the force majeure.
B. Assignment and/or Ownership Clause
Assignment or ownership clauses require the producer to give notice
to the purchaser (pipeline) of assignments or transfers of ownership.
Certain types of these clauses impose strict requirements on the producer
before an assignment is binding on the purchaser (pipeline). An example
of such a clause is shown below:
No transfer, assignment, conveyance, or encumbrance of any kind, of
any interest whatsoever in respect of which production is delivered to
buyer hereunder shall be binding upon buyer until buyer shall have
been given written notice thereof and furnished with duly certified cop-
ies of records evidencing the same.
In one case in which this author participated, the assignment clause
took on crucial meaning. The producers (both the assignor and assignee)
gave the pipeline notice of the transfer of ownership through execution of
division orders and correspondence. However, they did not give the
pipeline certified copies of the transfer as required by the contract. The
legitimacy of the transfer of ownership was crucial because the assignor
(but not the assignee) had signed offers of credit through which the pipe-
line had accrued substantial credit rights against the assignor. During a
settlement conference, the presiding magistrate indicated to the producer
that failure to comply with the strict language of the assignment clause
might be fatal to the case, inasmuch as the credits built up against the
assignor were more than enough to offset the take-or-pay claim.57
57. Other cases involving similar facts have been found. See, eg., Prima Energy Corp. v. Pan-
handle E. Pipe Line Co., No. 89 CV 331, slip op. at 9 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Weld County Oct. 5, 1990)
(enforcing assignment notice clause); R.J.B. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 813
P.2d 14, 19-20 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990) (reversing award and remanding because pipeline company
was not allowed to rebut evidence that notice or a copy of assignments was given to it as required by
contract). But see Lone Mountain Prod. Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 710 F. Supp. 305,
309-12 (D. Utah 1989) (holding that failure to strictly comply with formalities of assignment provi-
sion not fatal to recovery by producer, because the pipeline company was barred by waiver and
estoppel to assert the defense). Lone Mountain is analyzed in Pierce, supra note 9, § 1.03[2][d]. See
generally David E. Pierce, An Analytical Approach to Drafting Assignments, 44 Sw. L.J. 943 (1990).
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C. Arbitration Clause
An arbitration clause in a gas purchase contract may decrease the
time and costs required for resolution of disputes. However, an arbitra-
tion clause limits the ability of the parties to seek relief from the courts.
Consequently, careful drafting of such clauses is imperative.
Arbitration provisions were contained in many natural gas con-
tracts.58  Courts favored arbitration clauses in the name of public pol-
icy,59 and upheld limitations on appellate review of arbitrator decisions.'
58. See D.H. Gregg, Negotiating and Drafting Gas Purchase Contracts on Behalf of the Seller,
13 INST. ON OIL & GAs L. & TAX'N 87, 142 (1962); Milligan, supra note 37, at 801; Lewis G.
Mosburg, Jr., Analysis of Producer Gas Sale Contracts, 17 OKLA. L. REv. 249, 281 (1964); William
D. Watson, The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and Gas Purchase Contracts, 27B ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 1407, 1430-31 (1982). A typical arbitration clause is shown below:
Any controversy arising from determination or redetermination of prices between the
parties not resolved by agreement shall be determined by a board of arbitration upon notice
of submission given either by Buyer or Seller, which request shall also name one arbitrator.
The party receiving such notice, shall, within ten (10) days thereafter, by notice to the
other, name the second arbitrator, or failing so to do, the party giving notice of submission
shall name the second. The two (2) arbitrators so appointed shall name the third, or failing
to do so within ten (10) days the third arbitrator may be appointed by the person who is at
the time the Senior (in service) Judge of the United States District Court for that District in
which the leases covered hereby are situated.
The arbitrators selected to act hereunder shall be qualified by education, experience
and training to pass upon the particular question in dispute.
The arbitrators so appointed shall promptly hear and determine (after giving the par-
ties due notice of hearing and a reasonable opportunity to be heard) the questions submit-
ted and shall render their decision within sixty (60) days after appointment of the third
arbitrator. If within said period a decision is not rendered by a board or a majority thereof,
new arbitrators may be named and shall act hereunder at the election of either Buyer or
Seller in like manner as if none had been previously named.
The decision of the arbitrators, or of majority thereof, made in writing shall be final
and binding upon the parties hereto as to the questions submitted and the parties will abide
by and comply with such decision. Each party shall bear the expenses of its arbitrator, and
the expenses of the third arbitrator shall be borne equally by the Buyer and Seller except
that each party shall bear the compensation and expense of its counsel, witnesses and
employees.
59. See, eg., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., I1l S. Ct. 1647 (1991) (enforcing arbi-
tration clause in an employment agreement that precluded a separate age discrimination suit); Shear-
son/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238-42 (1987) (subjecting RICO claim to
arbitration agreement). Federal law and a majority of states provide for arbitration. See 9 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1-16 (West 1970 & Supp. 1991); UNIF. ARBrrRATION AcT, 7 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1991) (table of
jurisdictions enacting the Act).
60. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36-38 (1987); United Steel-
workers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960). Grounds for vacating the arbitration
award are set out in the federal statute at 9 U.S.C.A. § 10 (West Supp. 1991) and in the Oklahoma
Statutes at OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 812 (1981). See Margaret Shulenberger, Annotation, Construction
and Application of§ 1O(a-d) of United States Arbitration Act of 1947 (9 USCS § 1O(a-d)), Providing
Grounds for Vacating Arbitration Awards, 20 A.L.R. FED. 295 (1974) (collection of cases). An error
of law, by itself, will not justify reversal of the arbitration award. See Medina, A Report from the
Battle Zone, supra note 3, at 2564 n.71, reprinted in 24 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. DIG. at 278
n.71. In some jurisdictions an arbitrator may award punitive damages even if a court would not. See
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However, application of arbitration to natural gas and other natural re-
sources transactions has met with mixed reviews from commentators. 61
The litigation history in the courts indicates that arbitration agreements
will be enforced,62 even when the arbitration award involves fairly crea-
tive remedies.63
The key issues to consider in drafting an arbitration agreement are:
(1) the method of selecting the arbitrator;" (2) the issues to be submitted
to the arbitrator; (3) the timetable, if any, governing when the arbitration
panel must reach a decision; (4) whether the arbitration panel must set
forth its reasoning in an opinion; (5) the inclusion of any procedural
rules, or the adoption of standard procedures set forth by a neutral or-
ganization such as the American Arbitration Association; and (6) any
limitations on the arbitrator's remedial authority.
Timothy E. Travers, Annotation, Arbitrator's Power to Award Punitive Damages, 83 A.L.R.3D 1037,
1040 (1978).
In reviewing an arbitration, courts will employ a deferential standard of review. See
Anderman/Smith Operating Co. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 918 F.2d 1215, 1217-18 (5th Cir.
1990) (afflrming district court's confirmation of arbitrator's decision that required pipeline, in order
to exercise market-out right, to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the existing
price was so high that the pipeline could not remain competitive in its end use markets), cert. denied,
Ill S. Ct. 2799 (1991).
61. See generally James K. Brown & John P. Melick, The Arbitration Alternative for Various
Coal, Oil, and Gas Non-Labor Disputes, 5 E. MIN. L. INsT. § 1.01 (1984); Jay F. Lapin & Roger J.
Patterson, Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Strategies for Litigation and Settlement of Legal
Claims, 40 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N § 6.01 (1989); Bruce S. Marks, Commercial Conflict
Management and Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Oil and Gas Industry, 41 INST. ON OIL & GAS
L. & TAX'N § 9.01 (1990); D. Alan Rudlin & Michael R. Shebelskie, The Myths and Realities of
Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques, 9 E. MIN. L. INST. § 2.01 (1988); William Pannill &
Katherine L. Butler, How to Survive Arbitration Under the Typical Gas Contract (paper presented to
ABA Workshop on Take-or-Pay and Ratable Take Issues, July 1986, on file with the Tulsa Law
Journal).
62. See, eg., Falcon Petroleum Co. v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 787 P.2d 1297 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1990) (arbitration clause enforced in part in take-or-pay dispute); Transwestern Pipeline Co. v.
Horizon Oil & Gas Co., 809 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (holding
arbitration clause in original contract governed disputes under settlement agreement where settle-
ment agreement only modified but did not extinguish original contract); Mewboure Oil Co. v.
Blackburn, 793 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, mand. overr.) (enforcing arbitration proce-
dure); Valero Energy Corp. v. Wagner & Brown, II, 777 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, writ
denied) (subjecting contract, including tort claim, to arbitration).
63. See eg., Anderman/Smith Operating Co. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., No. J89-1066(W)
(S.D. Miss. May 30, 1990), aff'd, 918 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1990) (providing that any price change
desired by the pipeline must first be approved by the arbitration panel), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2799
(1991).
64. Contract provisions typically provide for a panel of three arbitrators: one selected by the
producer, one by the pipeline, and the third by the selected arbitrators (if possible). See supra note
58 and accompanying text. Thus, the third, "independent" arbitrator often makes the ultimate deci-
sion. This three arbitrator procedure is criticized in MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATiON § 20.03 (rev. ed. 1984 & Supp. 1990).
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D. Forum Selection Clause
Although not traditionally included in gas contracts, a forum selec-
tion clause may benefit parties to the gas contract. Experience indicates
that a forum selection clause would reduce the rush to obtain a favorable
forum that frequently occurs in gas contract disputes.65 Without the
clause, the producer who writes a formal demand letter to the pipeline
attempting to negotiate a settlement runs the risk that the pipeline might
respond by filing suit for a declaratory judgment in the pipeline's forum
of choice. The forum can be critical in any action, and particularly in a
take-or-pay or gas contract action. For example, a producer would not
want to prosecute a take-or-pay action against: Northern Natural Gas
Company in Omaha, Nebraska; any pipeline in Minneapolis or Chicago
in the dead of winter; or a pipeline in a forum in which a determination
would be five years away. Thus, careful use of a forum selection clause
might obviate a rush to litigation and give lead time for negotiation and
possible settlement.
Although forum selection clauses have been affirmed as valid by the
United States Supreme Court,66 there is a split of authority as to their
enforceability in state court.67 The general rule is that if the parties are
commercial entities, no indication of adhesion or oppression exists, and
the forum selected has a reasonable connection with the dispute, the
65. See, eg., ANR Pipeline Co. v. Conoco, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 439 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (prohibit-
ing producer from bringing duplicate litigation in other forum or removing action to federal court);
see also Williams Natural Gas Co. v. Amoco Prod. Co., No. 11040, 1991 WL 58387 (Del. Ch. Apr.
16, 1991) (the pipeline company invoked Delaware jurisdiction to construe Kansas contracts). Of
course, there was no reason why the producer should not have played the same game. See, eg.,
Kaiser-Francis Oil Co. v. ANR Pipeline Co., No. CJ-87-00428 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Tulsa County Jan.
27, 1987) (issuing temporary restraining order that prohibited pipeline from filing suit on contracts
except in the pending action).
In the absence of a forum selection clause, the party filing a preemptive attack must carefully
consider the venue. A miscalculation as to the "best" forum might not be correctable. See, eg.,
BHP Petroleum Co. v. Millard, 800 S.W.2d 838 (rex. 1990). In Millard, the producer filed suit in a
Texas district court forum. The pipeline subsequently filed a declaratory judgment counterclaim.
The producer then dismissed its claim. Later, the producer unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the
counterclaim and the Texas Supreme Court denied a write of certiorari to review the lower court's
decision. Id
66. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991); M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
67. See 17A AM. JuR. 2D Contracts § 266 (1991) (discussing enforceability); Richard D. Freer,
Erie's Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TuL. L. REv. 1087, 1096 n.31 (1989) (listing thirteen states which reject
forum selection clauses); Leandra Lederman, Note, Viva Zapatal" Toward a Rational System of
Forum-Selection Clause Enforcement in Diversity Cases, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 422 (1991); Francis M.
Dougherty, Annotation, Validity of Contractual Provision Limiting Place or Court in Which Action
May be Brought, 31 A.L.R.4TH 404 (1984) (discussing federal and state cases construing forum
selection clauses).
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clause will be enforced.6"
E. Quality Clause
The quality clause, contained in every gas contract, specifies mini-
mum standards of gas the seller must deliver under the contract before
the buyer is obligated to take the gas. The standards, set by the pipeline,
include: water specifications; minimum and possibly maximum British
thermal units ("Btu") levels; and impurity levels for sulphur compounds,
oxygen, nitrogen, carbon dioxide and other chemical ingredients.
In past litigation, pipelines have used minute quality deficiencies
that would not have an adverse safety impact to excuse their perform-
ance of the gas contract. For example, if the Btu requirement was 1000
and the test on a well indicated 999, four years later a pipeline might
assert a quality defect as an excuse for not taking the gas. In the past,
pipelines had mixed success when utilizing this defense.
Most quality clauses required the pipeline to give notice to the pro-
ducer of a quality defect so the producer could attempt to cure the defect.
Even if notice was not specifically required in the contract, courts con-
strued the quality provision to include an implied notice obligation.
Thus, the pipeline's failure to give sufficient notice precluded the de-
fense. 69 Similarly, courts were skeptical about pipeline assertions of qual-
ity defects when pipelines continued to take gas from sellers with which
68. See, eg., Seattle-First Natl Bank v. Manges, 900 F.2d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming
injunction enforcing forum selection clause); Knight Medical, Inc. v. Nihon Kohden Am., Inc., 765
F. Supp. 291 (M.D.N.C. 1991) (enforcing forum choice provision); Appell v. George Philip & Son,
Ltd., 760 F. Supp. 167 (D. Nev. 1991) (holding that forum selection clause was enforceable). But cf
Carefree Vacations, Inc. v. Brunner, 615 F. Supp. 211, 214 (W.D. Tenn. 1985) (holding that choice
of Texas as forum was unenforceable because Texas had no contacts with the contract or with the
parties); Eads v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 785 P.2d 328 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989) (stating
general rule, but finding forum clause under particular facts of case unenforceable).
In addition, the parties should consider inserting a choice of law provision that stipulates which
state law will govern the interpretation, construction and enforcement of the contract. Oklahoma
has traditionally enforced such clauses if the jurisdiction selected has some connection with the
contract or the parties. See, eg., Roush v. National Old Line Ins. Co., 453 F. Supp. 247 (W.D. Okla.
1978); National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Whitlock, 180 P.2d 647 (Okla. 1946), and if such
clause's enforcement would not violate Oklahoma public policy, Klein v. Keller, 141 P. 1117 (Okla.
1914). UCC § 1-105 explicitly permits choice of law provisions.
69. See Report and Recommendation of U.S. Magistrate at 9-10, Prospective Inv. & Trading
Co. v. Producer's Gas Co., No. 86-C-986-C (N.D. Okla. Dec. 20, 1988) (adopted by court July 7,
1989); Kaiser-Francis Oil Co. v. Producer's Gas Co., No. 83-C-400-B (N.D. Okla. June 19, 1985)
(noting that implicit in the quality clause is that purchaser must provide notice to seller of failure of
quality so that seller can have an opportunity to cure), aff'd, 870 F.2d 563 (10th Cir. 1989); South.
port Exploration, Inc. v. Producer's Gas Co., No. 83-C-550-B, slip op. at 7 (N.D. Okla. June 6,
1984) (holding that buyer waived right to object to quality because it took the gas and failed to give
notice of defect to the seller). For a general discussion and samples of quality clauses in gas con-
tracts, see Gilliam, supra note 15, § 6.05; Gregg, supra note 58, at 125, 177-79; Ben R. Howell, Gas
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they had entered into a settlement.70 The lack of a curative provision in
the quality clause should not deprive the producer of a right to cure be-
cause the right to cure is found in the UCC.71
Past disputes suggest that the producer and the buyer carefully con-
sider the quality provision during negotiation. The contract should re-
quire the buyer (pipeline) to give precise and specific notice (preferably
written) of any defects in the gas within a certain period of time and give
the producer the right to timely cure defects. The producer, in the
course of its contract maintenance and administration, should carefully
monitor the quality of the gas to assure it meets the specifications set
forth in the contract.
F. Billing or Audit Clause
Many gas contracts contain what is known as a billing or audit
clause. A typical billing clause follows:
As soon as practicable following the end of each accounting month
during the term hereof, buyer shall furnish to seller a statement of all
gas delivered hereunder by seller during the preceding accounting
month; and buyer shall pay seller by the 20th day of each calendar
month for all gas delivered to buyer hereunder during the preceding
accounting month in accordance with each such statement; provided
that each party shall have the right, at reasonable hours, to examine
the books and records of the other party to the extent necessary to
verify the accuracy of any statement, payment or calculation relating
to the gas delivered hereunder. If any such examination reveals any
inaccuracy, the necessary adjustment and such payment statements
and payments shall be promptly made, provided that no adjustment
for any statement or payment shall be made after a lapse of two (2)
years from the date hereof unless challenged prior thereto.
In past gas contract litigation, some pipelines argued that this clause
was a contractual limitation period, thus shortening the normal four or
Purchase Contracts, 4 INsT. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 151, 163-64 (1953); John R. Rebman,
Drafting Natural Gas Sales Contracts Under Conditions of Gas Supply Shortage-The Producer-
Seller's View, 19 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 205, 230-32 (1974).
70. See Kaiser-Francis Oil Co. v. Producer's Gas Co., 870 F.2d 563, 566-68 (10th Cir. 1989).
71. Under UCC § 2-508, a seller, upon rejection by the buyer for a non-conforming tender, has
the right to effect a cure. See 3 ANDERSON, supra note 20, § 2-508:1 to :17; 2 HAWKLAND, supra
note 20, § 2-508:01 to :07; William H. Lawrence, Cure Under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code: Practices and Prescriptions, 21 UCC L.J. 138 (1988); Michael A. Schmitt, The Seller's Right to
Cure Non-Conforming Tenders-If at First You Don't Succeed, Try to Try Again, 87 COM. L.J. 283
(1982). Seasonable notice of rejection is required by UCC § 2-602. See 4 ANDERSON, supra note 20,
§ 2-602:4; 3 HAWKLAND, supra note 20, § 2-602:02; Joe D. Dillsaver, Notice in Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 22 UCC L.J. 66, 77-79 (1989).
1991]
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five year statutory period for bringing a breach of contract action. Pipe-
lines sought to minimize their damages by shortening the period of time
for which the producer could recover for failure to take or pay for gas.72
Although the UCC permits contracts to reduce the otherwise applicable
statute of limitation period,73 courts disfavor and strictly construe such
provisions against the party invoking the shortened period. 4 The parties
must expressly state that such a provision was intended to be a contrac-
tual limitation. 75  Most of the audit provisions failed to reflect that spe-
cific intent. One court noted that "[t]he fact that claims for discrepancies
must be presented within two years does not indicate any clear intention
to shorten the statutory limitation period in the event of a suit based
upon a breach of agreement."'76
Experience shows that a billing and audit clause, boilerplate in the
past, must be carefully analyzed in the future. If such a clause is inserted
in the contract, the parties should state whether it is intended as a con-
tractual limitation. In any event, the producer should carefully monitor
its accounting department and make sure that amounts paid for, and gas
taken, every month does in fact satisfy the contractual provisions on pay-
ment and pricing. Should a dispute arise, the producer should quickly
initiate conversation with the buyer.
72. See eg., Benson Mineral Group, Inc. v. Enron Gas Processing Co., No. 89-1186-K (D.
Kan. Jan. 14, 1991); Kansas Petroleum, Inc. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 710 F. Supp. 758 (D.
Kan. 1989); Conoco, Inc. v. Tenneco, Inc., 524 So. 2d 1305 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 525 So. 2d
1048 (La. 1988). Typically, an audit or billing clause requires a challenge within the specified period,
not the filing of a suit. This requirement suggests that such a clause is not a contractual limitation.
See Exxon Corp. v. Crosby-Mississippi Resources, Ltd., 775 F. Supp. 969, 975-76 (S.D. Miss. 1991)
(finding that time limitation in billing clause required a challenge be raised within the period, not the
filing of a suit). For a brief discussion of such clauses and a sample billing clause that does not
contain a time period, see Gregg, supra note 58, at 141, 189.
73. U.C.C. § 2-725(1), lB U.L.A. 587 (1989). See 5 ANDERSON, supra note 20, §§ 2-725:105,
:107.
74. In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 391 F. Supp. 1404, 1407 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Prior Lake State
Bank v. National Sur. Corp., 80 N.W.2d 612, 616 (Minn. 1957); see Schafer v. Buckeye Union Ins.
Co., 381 N.E.2d 519, 522-23 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978).
75. Ontario Hydro v. Zallea Sys., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1261, 1265 (D. Del. 1983); see, e.g., Welch
v. Mitchell, 351 So. 2d 911, 916-17 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977) (holding express warranty expired in
twelve months did not limit the time for filing suit the same period); Lieb v. Milne, 625 P.2d 1233,
1237 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (fixed time for duration of seller's warranty not a contractual limitation,
and did not require that suit be brought within the warranty period).
76. Oil & Gas Ventures-First 1958 Fund, Ltd. v. Kung, 250 F. Supp. 744, 753 (S.D.N.Y.
1966). Producers should not overlook state constitutional or statutory provisions limiting the effec-
tiveness of notice and/or contractual limitation clauses. See, eg., OKLA. CONST. art. XXIII, § 9;
OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 216 (1981).
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G. Pricing Clause
All gas contracts contain pricing provisions that set forth the price
which the buyer must remit to the producer for gas taken. Such pricing
clauses have been the subject of litigation disputes," particularly when
federal deregulation led to ambiguity in the price. A drafter of a pricing
clause should create a pricing mechanism that anticipates events in the
future that might create an uncertainty in the pricing such as governmen-
tal regulation. The drafter should normally avoid gaps in the pricing
structure (occurrences which would lead to no price or an ambiguous
price). If a gap is intended, the drafter should carefully consider the im-
pact of the gap in the event a dispute arises. For instance, the UCC has
numerous gap fillers,7" including one for a reasonable price in the event a
gap in the price term exists.7 9 Usually, the parties would be in a more
certain position if they negotiate a pricing structure that would cover all
possible situations.
77. See, ag., Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. JER Partnership, 943 F.2d 1219 (10th Cir.
1991); Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Pursue Energy, 781 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1986); Walsh Bros. v.
Celeron Corp., 510 So. 2d 1282 (La. Ct. App.), cert denied, 513 So. 2d 293 (La. 1987); Vince Allen
& Assocs., Inc. v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 788 P.2d 414 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989); Houston Oil &
Minerals Corp. v. Enserch Corp., 732 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); cf. Grynberg v. Rocky Mountain Natural Gas, 809 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that although take-or-pay contract is an alternative performance contract, producer cannot
calculate prices based on "pay" alternative so as to justify [higher] NGPA § 102 rates because pipe-
line was able to perform "take" alternative and thus [lower] NGPA § 104 rates would be applicable).
For a discussion of pricing clauses, see David Crump, Natural Gas Price Escalation Clauses A
Legal and Economic Analysis, 70 MINN. L. REv. 61 (1985); Al H. Ringleb et al., Natural Gas Con-
tract Periodic Price Redeterminations A Statistical Methodology with Preliminary Empirical Results,
10 ENERGY L.J. 81 (1989). For a collection of cases, see 4 SUMMERS, supra note 15, § 761.
78. See, ag., U.C.C. §§ 2-305 (price), 2-306 (quantity), 2-308 (place of delivery), 2-309 (time of
delivery), 2-503 (tender by seller), 2-509 (risk of loss), 2-511 (tender by buyer), 2-513 (buyer's inspec-
tion). See generally 1 WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 19, §§ 3-5 to -9; William D. Hawkland, Sales
Contract Terms Under the UCC, 17 UCC L.J. 195 (1985).
79. U.C.C. § 2-305. See 2 ANDERSON, supra note 20, § 2-305:1 to :23; 2 HAWKLAND, supra
note 20, § 2-305-01 to :05; Timothy E. Travers, Annotation, Construction and Application of UCC
§ 2-305 Dealing With Open Price Term Contracts, 91 A.L.R.3D 1237 (1979). For an application of
§ 2-305 to an analogous situation, see North Cent. Airlines, Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 574 F.2d
582 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (price mechanism set forth in contract made inoperable by enactment of federal
price regulation of oil and introduction of two-tier pricing system; court used § 2-305 to provide a
price). A provision designed to avoid a gap upon deregulation follows:
For gas produced, sold and delivered hereunder, or any portion thereof, which the
United States Congress, FERC, or any other governmental authority having jurisdiction in
the premises, ceases or has already ceased to have jurisdiction or exercise control over rates
that may be lawfully charged and collected (hereinafter referred to as "deregulated gas"):
The price of $6.00 per MMBtu effective January 1, 1982, which price shall be in-
creased on the first day of each month thereafter by an amount equal to one half of one per
cent (.005) above the price in effect during the previous month.
For a discussion of deregulation clauses, see Turner, supra note 10.
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H. Dedication Clause
A dedication clause, included in most gas purchase contracts, speci-
fies which wells or gas reserves (by property or legal description) are
dedicated to the purchaser.8 0 Ambiguous dedication clauses and the par-
ties' inconsistent course of performance have resulted in disputes over
whether specific wells were covered by the particular contract.8 ' In the
future, producers may abandon the practice of dedicating a particular
well to the contract in favor of simply agreeing to satisfy supply commit-
ments from any available source.
I. Market-Out Clause
Thoughtful purchasers included provisions in their contracts that
gave them rights to reduce the applicable price or to terminate the con-
tract.82 Such provisions, known as market-out clauses, should carefully
define the rights, standards upon which the rights may be exercised (sub-
jective or objective), the range of permissible pricing modification, and
the frequency with which such rights may be exercised.8 3 A seller may
also insist upon the right in the contract to upward adjustments of price
or to terminate the agreement in instances when a seller's market exists.8 4
J. Ratchet Clause
A ratchet clause grants a buyer the right to reduce the daily contract
quantity upon failure of the producer to deliver the amount of gas re-
quested by the pipeline.8" The issue which frequently resolved ratchet
80. 4 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 724.6 (1991); Howell, supra note 69, at
155-58 (1952); J. Clayton La Grone, Natural Gas Contracting in the '80s, 32 INST. ON OIL & GAS L.
& TAX'N 25, 29-32 (1981).
81. See, eg., Benson Mineral Group, Inc. v. Enron Gas Processing Co., No. 89-1186-K (D.
Kan. Jan. 14, 1991); Shawmar Oil Co., Inc. v. Williams Natural Gas Co., No. 89-4081-S, 1990 WL
186286 (D. Kan. Oct. 9, 1990).
82. See Johnson, supra note 15, at 104-05; Turner, supra note 10, at 521-22.
83. For examples of such clauses, see Anderman/Smith Operating Co. v. Tennessee Gas Pipe-
line Co., 918 F.2d 1215, 1218-19 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming narrow construction given market-out
clause by arbitration panel), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2799 (1991); American Exploration Co. v. Co-
lumbia Gas Transmission Corp., 779 F.2d 310, 313-14 (6th Cir. 1985) (affirming denial of prelimi-
nary injunction request by producer, noting that contract provision permitted buyer to discontinue
buying gas "for such length of time as in its judgement it is deemed expedient"); and Kennedy &
Mitchell, Inc. v. Anadarko Prod. Co., 754 P.2d 803, 807 (Kan. 1988) (holding gas contract market-
out provision gave buyer unilateral right to determine when the contract price was unacceptable and
to propose a lower price). See also Turner, supra note 10, at 519-22.
84. Many producers negotiated price escalation clauses into their contracts. See Crump, supra
note 77; Johnson, supra note 15, at 94-108; Ringleb et al., supra note 77; Turner, supra note 10, at
515-19.
85. One commonly used provision follows:
[Vol. 27:283
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clause 6 disputes concerned notice. Some clauses required notice to the
producer of the buyer's election or option to reduce the daily contract
quantity; 7 others did not." The notice obligation often defeated the de-
fense because the pipeline's use of the ratchet clause as a defense to an
accrued take-or-pay claim was largely one of hindsight.8 9 Ratchet
clauses commonly provided a mechanism by which the producer could
restore the previous daily contract quantity level. Thus, the clause was
mostly effective in instances where no notice was required. With notice,
the producer could be expected to undertake curative measures to restore
the daily contract quantity.90 A notice requirement should be explicitly
In the event seller fails to deliver the volumes requested by Buyer up to one hundred
eleven (111) percent of the applicable daily contract quantity for five (5) consecutive days,
then at Buyer's option, commencing with the first day of the month following the end of
the fifth day of such failure to deliver and continuing thereafter until adjusted as hereinaf-
ter provided, the applicable daily contract quantity may be reduced to ninety (90) percent
of the average daily volumes delivered during such five day period.
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. ANR Pipeline Co., 768 S.W.2d 777, 779 (Trex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1989, no writ). Such clauses not only reduced take-or-pay obligations but also created the
serious potential for overtake credits in favor of the pipeline, which could offset undertakes in other
days of the year.
86. The phrase "ratchet clause" was coined because the provision enabled the pipeline to
"ratchet" down its daily contract quantity obligation. See Pyro Energy Corp. v. Kansas Power &
Light Co., No. 62765, 1989 WL 69457 (Kan. Ct. App. June 23, 1989).
87. For example, the clause in supra note 83, which provides "at Buyer's option," implies no-
tice. Furthermore, the inclusion of a curative provision also pointed to a notice requirement. How
could a producer exercise its curative rights without notice of the pipeline's exercise of its ratchet
down rights? Cf Kaiser-Francis Oil Co. v. Producer's Gas Co., No. 83-C-400-B, 1985 WL 9668
(N.D. Okla. June 19, 1985) (holding that including a curative provision in the quality clause implies
an obligation on the pipeline to give notice of its exercise of ratchet down rights), aff'd, 870 F.2d 563
(10th Cir. 1989). In addition, a pipeline seeking to invoke a ratchet clause should be required,
through contemporaneous documentation, to establish that the pipeline acted to reduce the daily
contract quality.
88. "In the event Buyer requests such quantities on any day or days and Seller is unable, un-
willing or fails for any reason to deliver such quantities, the Seller's Delivery Capacity shall be
reduced to such quantities as Seller is able, willing or does not fail to deliver .... Pyro Energy
Corp., No. 62765, 1989 WL 69457, at *4. Even if a notice provision is not included in the ratchet
clause, notice may still be required under the auspices of good faith. See U.C.C. § 2-103, 1 U.L.A.
185 (1989).
89. See Dyco Petroleum Corp. v. ANR Pipeline Co., No. 86-C-1097-E, slip op. at 12-13 (N.D.
Okla. Aug. 29, 1990) (holding that term "election" in clause defeated pipeline's claim that daily
contract quantity should automatically reduce and construing the clause to require ANR to make an
affirmative election); cf. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. ANR Pipeline Co., 768 S.W.2d 777, 785 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ) (Brown, C.J., concurring) ("I would also hold the 'op-
tion' provision does not apply as a matter of law in that it is 'at Buyer's option' and hence is invoked
only by some form of notice which was not given."). But cf Pyro Energy Corp., No. 62765, 1989
WL 69457 (holding that force majeure clause, in conjunction with ratchet clause, justified jury's
verdict in favor of pipeline).
90. An example of a ratchet clause follows:
In the event the daily contract quantity is adjusted downward as provided in this
Section 4, then Seller shall have the opportunity to restore all or a portion of such daily
contract quantity by written request to Buyer to conduct a deliverability test; provided,
however, if as a result of such test the daily contract quantity is not restored to the daily
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written by future drafters into provisions of future contracts along with a
reasonable mechanism to permit the producer to restore the deliverable
level.
K. Regulations Applicable Clause
The regulations applicable clause provides that a contract is subject
to governmental laws and regulations. Ordinarily, a regulations applica-
ble clause should not be incorporated in the contract because inclusion of
the clause may be interpreted by the courts as more than a meaningless
boilerplate provision. In essence, the clause is meaningless because all
contracts are clearly subject to governing law.91 To avoid rendering a
regulations applicable clause meaningless, courts may construe it as
meaning something the parties had not intended. 92 For example, pipe-
lines have attempted to broaden the scope of a force majeure provision
with the regulations applicable clause.
VII. CONCLUSION
The contract drafting lessons of the past, learned the hard way by
many participants, should be valuable for the future. Past take-or-pay
wars illustrate the necessity for careful consideration of even the most
boilerplate of provisions. However, drafters should not rely on the past
to repeat itself. Parties must expect the unexpected when drafting a long-
term contract in an area of overlapping federal, international and eco-
nomic considerations. The parties must seek to accommodate both their
common and divergent interests in a form flexible enough to withstand
the vagaries of time.
contract quantity in effect prior to such downward adjustment, Seller shall not be permit-
ted for a period of ninety (90) days following the completion of such test to request Buyer
to conduct a subsequent test. It is further provided that upon receipt of notice from Seller
that the inability to deliver gas well gas has been remedied, Buyer may, in lieu of con-
ducting such test, notify Seller that commencing with the first day of the month following
receipt of said notice from Seller, the downward adjustment in the daily contract quantity
as provided in this Section 4 shall no longer be effective.
91. Buckles v. Wil-Mc Oil Corp. 585 P.2d 1360, 1362 (Okla. 1978); 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts
§§ 381, 382 (1991).
92. Courts will presume that contractual language is not meaningless. Thus, considering the
purpose of the contract as a whole, a court will attempt to give meaning to every aspect of the
instrument. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 159 (1981). The primary goal in giving meaning to ambiguous
contractual language is to facilitate performance. 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts §§ 386, 387. The dan-
ger lies in whether or not the court will construe the regulations applicable clause in a manner
intended by the parties. See, e.g., Dyco Petroleum Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., No. 86-C-897-
E (N.D. Okla. Nov. 1, 1988) (rejecting contention that regulations applicable clause broadened force
majeure provision to encompass regulation affecting market prices). The basic lesson is to avoid
inserting provisions that serve no identifiable purpose.
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